We consider network design in which each pair of nodes can communicate via a direct link and the communication flow can be delivered through any path in the network. The cost of flow through each link is discounted if and only if the amount of flow exceeds certain threshold. This exploitation of economies of scale encourages the concentration of flows and use of relatively small number of links. We will call such networks hub-like networks. _Applications include telecommunications, airline traffic flow, and mail delivery networks. The COKT of services delivered through a hub-like network is distributed among its users who may be individuals or organizations with possibly conflicting interests. The cooperation of these users is essential for the exploitation of economies of scale. Consequently. there is a need t o find a fair distribution of the cost of providing the service among users of such network. In order to describe this cost allocation problem we formulate the associated cooperative game, to be referred to as the hublike game. In this game special attention is paid to users' contribution t o economies of scale. \ \ -e then demonstrate that certain cost allocation solution (the core of hub-like game), which provide users with the incentive t o cooperate, can be efficiently characterized.
Introduction
The motivation for this work came from the studies of so called liub networks. ivhich play an important role in modeling transportation and telecommunication systems. In hub communication networks a certain subset of focal nodes (i.e. hubs) is fully interconnected. lvhile other nodes are connected to those hubs. The communication between nodes is done esclusively via hubs. The assumption is that hub nodes are completely interconnected. while norl-hub nodes ale connected to one or more hubs. Moreover, the cost of traffic between hubs is discounted. The advantage of hub networks is the usage of relatively small nuniber of links ancl exploitation of economies of scale by concentrating flows. The hub networks were estensi\-ely studied over the last couple of decades (see for example, [1] . [5] , [6] and [14] ). Numerous coulputational studies show that hub networks are quite attractive and practical. Nevertheless. the restrictions imposed with the hub network model is sometimes to prohibitive. For esample. in sonie cases a high traffic between a non-hub and hub node is not discounted and/or the traffic between two huhs is not big enough t o warrant any discounts.
Recently, Podnar et al. (in [ i ] ) introduced the network model in which each pair of nodes can communicate directly, and the cost of sending flow through any link is discounted if and only if the amount of flow exceeds certain threshold. We will refer to their model as to hub-iike network (HLN) . Their paper provides combinatorial foriiiulations of the hub-like network optimization problem. In addition, therein they developed an efficient heuristic for finding the \ l P < t hub-like net work.
In this paper, we provide the first study of the associated cost allocation protlleni. The coSt of services delivered through a hublike network is distributed among its users n-ho may be individuals or organizations with possibly conflicting interests. The cooperation of these users is essential for t h e exploitation of economies of scale. Consequently. there is a n e d to find a fair distribution of the cost of providing the service among users of a hub network. IIL order to describe this cost allocation problem we formulate associated cooperative game, to be referred to as the hub-like game, in which special attention is paid t o users' contribution t o economies of scale. We then demonstrate that certain cost allocation solutions (the core of hub-like game). which provide users with the incentive to cooperate, can be efficiently characterized.
By concentrating flows, the connectivity protocol of hub-like networks is efficient in its use of a relatively small number of links and in the exploitation of economies of scale. System efficiency and economies of scale are best achieved by the cooperation of users. To that end it is essential to allocate the cost of delivering services through the hub-like network among its users in a fair manner. Failing to do so may cause some users to secede from the hub-like network and seek services from some other competing network. Such secession would inevitably result in a higher cost per unit of delivered service. T h e main objective of this paper is to develop a computationally tractable framework for a fair allocation of the cost of communication services delivered via the hub-like network among its users.
A ). For a survey and numerous references on cost allocation models in networks see, [9] . A common approach t o above papers is the formulation of the associated cost allocation problem as a cooperative game in characteristic function form, followed by the evaluation of various solution concepts such as core, nucleolus. kernel, the least €-core. Shapley value. etc.
It is well known that the above game theoretic solution concepts are computationally prohibitive even for relatively small problems. Moreover. there are no general practical algorithms for the computation of these solutions. Consequently. researchers have concentrated on individual classes of games to demonstrate that computation of cost allocation solution concepts is sometimes feasible in the context of a particular problem. In this paper we use such approach t o analyze the cost allocation problem associated with the hub-like network (HLN). In order t o describe this cost allocation problem we formulate cooperative game, t o be referred t o as the hub-like game. The emphasis of the formulation is 011 users' contribution t o economies of scale.
The core is a well known game theoretic solution concepts to the cost allocation problem which stimulate the cooperation of users. We investigate the computation of the core of the hublike game. Specifically, we provide a polynomial representation of the core of the hub-like game.
Recall that the purpose of hub-like networks is t o exploit the economies of scale by cooperation of users and by concentrating flows. The main contribution of this paper is the development of the coinputationally tractable framework for the fair cost allocation among users of a hublike network based on their contribution t o economies of scale. Such a cost allocation scheme stimulates users' cooperation and discourages them froni nioving t o competing networks.
The plan of the reminder of the paper follows. In Section 2, the HLN problem and some game theoretic concepts are defined. In Section 3. n-e formulate the hub-like game associated with the HLN problem. Section 4 provides the analysis of the core of a hub-like game. In Section 5 , our findings and concluding reinarks are summarized.
Definitions and Preliminaries
For completeness. we re-state the HLN problem a. < formulated by Podnar et. al. in [7] . The decision variables are given as follows. Let N b e the set of nodes. T h e cost of sending the unit of flow is assigned to every link by cost matrix D = (dk,,,). Input matrix F = ( , f 2, ) contains the required amounts of flow associated with every origin-destination pair (2, j ) . Variable ~1 2 ,~ captures the fraction of flow t h a t goes from node I to node j via link ( k , r n ) which is not discounted. I'ariable ~2;:~~ is the fraction of flow froin i to j (via (IC, m ) ) that is discounted.
Parameter 0, 0 < Q < 1 is the discount factor. Binary variable ykm is 1 if link ( k , mjfbis . .
, a large enough constant A4 is introduced t o assure that the discounted flow is either zero or greater than the given threshold, depending on y. If there is a non-discounted flow through the link ( k , m ) , then the value of this flow must be less than Q (constraint 3 ) . Constraints (2) and (3) imply that the flow through a link will be called x 2 if the flow is large enough ( 2 Q), otherwise it will be called 51. All ( i I j ) flow must originate from i (4) and must come to j ( 6 ) . The conservation of flow at node 1 is given by (8). Constraints (5) and (7) state that there is no unnecessary cycling. In [7] , the authors presented several formulations and heuristic algorithms to solve the HLN problem. Moreover. 
x(S) 5 c ( S ) for all S N , and z ( N ) = c ( N ) .
Observe that the core consists of all allocation vectors x which provide no incentive for any coalition to secede.
Hub-Like game
In this section, we will use a game theoretic approach to describe the cost allocation problem associated with the hub like network game. Specifically, we will formulate associated cooperative HLN problem ((1)-(8) ). The objective is to allocate this cost among users of hub-like network.
Since we need to satisfy the flow requirements for all pairs of users (nodes), the natural choice for the set of players seem to be the set of all node pairs, namely P = N * N . If will be called hub-like network game.
Core of the Hub-Like Network Game
Recall that the core of a game is an important concept of solution in the theory of cooperative games. It consists of all allocation vectors that provide no incentive for any coalition to secede. Specifically, each cost allocation vector in the core of a hub game allocates to each coalition of players at most the cost needed to provide service to that coalition. Namely, there is no cross-subsidization. In this Section, we will show that the core of a hub-like game can be efficiently characterized. Proof: Assume that the core constraints associated with all coalitions belonging LO collections SI and SL are satisfied. Let the coalition T c Ai * N be such that T 6 SI or Sz. We need to consider two cases.
DECOMPOSITION THEOREMS
( i ) If the total traffic generated by pairs in T is not sufficient to enable the discount for the traffic between hubs, then each pair of users in T is a single player coalition belonging to SI. and:
-. C k m ( i r j ) ) 2 C k r n ( i , j ) -Z k t r r ( i . j ) 2 0.
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(ii) If the total traffic generated by T is sufficient for the discount on the inter hub traffic, then for any ( i . j ) E N * N\T, by the inductive application of Leinnia 4.4 it follows that:
Hence, the core condition associated with tlie coalition T is redundant. 0
. Conclusions
In this paper. we investigated the cost allocation problem associated with the hub-like network design problem. The o1)jective was to develop a procedure to allocate the cost in a fair ( A T t N , c k t l , ) , and the core of each link game ca.n bo characterized nritli 271.~ linear coiistra?.iiits (T.4.5). Hcncc, the corc of tho game ( N * N , c) cit.11 actually be cliara.cterized with 0(n4) constraints.
If we now takc tlic optinial or tlie best knowii solution to tlie liul)-like lietwork problcrii we can easily geiierate the al)ove constraints for link games. Tlieii. every collection of feasible solutions to cores of link games would give us a. core point of tlie hub-like network game (T.4.1), aatl all such collcct,ioiis ~vvould give us tlie entire corc of the linblikc iirtwork ganic! (T.4.2).
In suiiiiiia.ry, we tlr\:eloped a fraiiiework for the efficient coinput ation of some hub-like network cost a1loca.tion solutions in which users are charged a fair sliare with respect to their contribution to economies of scale. Such schemes give the users incentive to cooperate ancl exploit cc.oiioiiiies of scale via participation in liul)-like network.
.I.. 1 Oiir iiiotl(~1 riiipliasizcs t,lic users' contribution to ccoiioiiiics of s d c .
